Optimal dynamic nonlinear income taxes: facing an uncertain future with a sluggish government by Berliant, Marcus & Fujishima, Shota
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Optimal dynamic nonlinear income taxes:
facing an uncertain future with a sluggish
government
Marcus Berliant and Shota Fujishima
Washington University in St. Louis
13. October 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/41947/
MPRA Paper No. 41947, posted 16. October 2012 10:49 UTC
Optimal Dynamic Nonlinear Income Taxes:
Facing an Uncertain Future with a Sluggish
Government
Marcus Berliant Shota Fujishimay
October 13, 2012
Abstract
We consider the optimal nonlinear income taxation problem in a dynamic,
stochastic environment when the government is sluggish in the sense that it
cannot change the tax rule as uncertainty resolves. We argue that the zero
top marginal tax rate result in static models is of little practical importance
because it actually holds only when the top earner in the initial period receives
the highest shock in every period.
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1 Introduction
Since theNewDynamic Public Financewas inaugurated, progress has beenmade
in clarifying what the optimal dynamic nonlinear income tax looks like. This
agenda aims to extend the seminal work of Mirrlees (1971), who studies optimal
income taxation in a static environment, to dynamic, stochastic environments.1
Dynamic tax rules are in eect dynamic contracts because taxpayers have private
information about their labor productivity, so the optimal dynamic income tax rule
is generally complicated: it is nonstationary and depends on the entire history
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of income declared for any taxpayer. However, it is questionable whether the
governments in the real world can implement such complex tax rules because
changing the tax rule frequently and tracking histories of income would entail
large administrative and political costs. Indeed, regarding the sationarity of the
tax rule, the US government has not changed its income tax system in a major way
since 1986. The Japanese government is more flexible, but it has not changed its
income tax system in a major way since 2007. Therefore, once their tax rules are
fixed, they persist for some time.
In view of this observation, we contribute to the New Dynamic Public Finance
literature by considering optimal dynamic income taxation when the government
cannot change the tax rule over time. Our interpretation is that we must restrict
our attention to a simple dynamic tax rule because our government is sluggish.
Naturally, we also assume that the sluggish government makes a full commitment
to its tax rule. That is, the government cannot change the tax rule once it is
determined in the initial period. Moreover, because the lengths of histories are
time-dependent, the sluggish government can look at only current incomes, just as
it can only look at current incomes in the initial period. Although our assumptions
might be extreme, we believe that it is important and useful to have a sense about
what the optimal dynamic income tax looks like when the set of tax rules is limited
to ones that are feasible in practice.
We consider a finite horizon model in which the government would like to
maximize the equal weight utilitalian social welfare function. Our economy is
heterogeneous because we fix the type distribution in the initial period.2 People re-
ceive idiosyncratic shocks in each period that are i.i.d. amongpeople but otherwise,
the stochastic structure is general.3 We assume that the government confiscates all
incomes that are not consumed in each period, so agents cannot save nor borrow.4
In fact, we show that a sluggish government cannot allow saving or borrowing
as long as it would like to address the inherent incentive problems. Although the
analytical characterizations and even numerical analysis of the optimal dynamic
2If we do not fix it, the model has identical agents facing uncertainty, which is like a macro
model. However, as long as we consider the equal weight utilitalian social welfare function, the
distinction is not essential for the optimal tax rule as Farhi and Werning (forthcoming) illustrate.
3In Section 2.2, we argue that focusing on idiosyncratic shocks is without loss of generality. We
could also consider aggregate shocks.
4This assumption is alsomade by Battaglini andCoate (2008)who study optimal income taxation
in a dynamic, stochastic environment.
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tax rule are dicult in general, we can analytically characterize the optimal tax rule
because our problem can be reduced to a static one due to the sluggishness of the
government. Specifically, this is because under a sluggish government, the tax rule
depends on only the current income, so we can regard an agent living for T periods
as distinct agents in each period and for each shock if we do not allow saving or
borrowing. Therefore, we can directly apply the arguments for static models to our
model.
A famous result in the static optimal income taxation is that the top marginal
tax rate is zero. That is, the top earner’s marginal tax rate is zero. However,
we cast doubt on its policy relevance as Diamond and Saez (2011) do. In our
dynamic stochastic economy, the support of types will move over time, and a
direct application of the static arguments implies that the marginal tax rate is zero
at the top of the expanded type space, or the union of supports over time. Thus, if
the largest value of the shock is positive, the zero top marginal tax result would
apply only when the top earner in the initial period receives the largest possible
value of shock in every period. Therefore, the event that the marginal tax rate is
zero at the ex post top actually has probability zero.
Our tax rule is fixed over time and therefore depends on only current income,
so it would be the simplest possible one in the literature. At the other extreme,
Battaglini and Coate (2008) and Kocherlakota (2005) study themost general rule by
considering nonstationary tax rules that depend on the history of income. Whereas
the stochastic structure of shock is general in Kocherlakota (2005), Battaglini and
Coate (2008) consider aMarkov chainwith two states.5 In themiddle, Albanesi and
Sleet (2006) study a nonstationary tax rule that depends on only current income
when the shock is i.i.d. Farhi andWerning (forthcoming) study a stationary tax rule
that depends on the history of income when the shock follows a Markov process.
See Table 1 for a comparison between our work and others’ work.6
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we state the basic
5On the other hand, whereas Kocherlakota (2005) does not consider the time-consistency of a tax
rule, Battaglini and Coate (2008) provide conditions under which their rule is time-consistent. In a
two-period deterministic environment, Berliant and Ledyard (forthcoming) study a time-consistent
tax rule that is nonstationary and depends on history.
6In a two-period deterministic environment, Gaube (2010) compares three types of nonstationary
tax rules: a tax rule that is time-consistent and depends on history; a tax rule that is not time-
consistent and depends on history; and a tax rule that depends on only current income (but can
change over time).
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Table 1: The position of this paper in the literature
Shock History Stationary Commitment
Battaglini and Coate (2008) Markov Yes No Yes/No
Kocherlakota (2005) General Yes No Yes
Albanesi and Sleet (2006) i.i.d. No No Yes
Farhi and Werning (forthcoming) Markov Yes Yes Yes
This paper General No Yes Yes
structure of the model, present our problem, and characterize the second-best tax
rule. Section 3 is a conclusion and discusses subjects for future research. Proofs
omitted from the main text are provided in an Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a finite horizon model with a unit mass of agents. The economy
lasts for T + 1 periods. In period 0, each agent is endowed with type w 2 W0  R++
distributed with density function fw. However, there are idiosyncratic shocks to
the agents’ types in the subsequent periods.7 Let Z  R be a compact set. At
the beginning of period 1, an element of zT = fztgTt=1 2 ZT is drawn for each agent
according to a density function fz. Then, if an agent is endowed with type w in
the initial period, his type will change to wt  t(w; zT) in period t where t(  ; zT)
is continuously dierentiable. For example, if we consider a linear technology,
t(w; zT) = w +
Pt
s=1 zs. We assume that for any w 2 W0, t(w; zT) > 0 for all zT 2 ZT
in any period. Moreover, we assume that the draws are i.i.d. among agents and
the law of large number holds.8 Thus, fz(zT) fw(w) denotes the fraction of agents
having type w in the initial period and getting shock zT.
The agents supply labor and consume the good produced under constant re-
turns to scale in each period. As is usual in optimal taxation models, they face a
7We can add a public or private aggregate shock without changing the main result. See Section
2.2.
8Kocherlakota (2005), for example, also makes these assumptions. Regarding the law of large
numbers, there are some technical issues for the case of continuum of i.i.d. random variables (Judd,
1985). However, Sun (2006) provides a solution to this issue by presenting a probability space in
which the law of large number holds.
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trade-o between consumption and leisure. The utility function is
U

fct; `tgTt=0

=
TX
t=0
tu(ct; `t) (1)
where ` 2 [0; 1] is labor, c is consumption, and  > 0 is the discount factor. We
assume that u(c; `) is twice continuously dierentiable, strictly concave, increasing
in c, and decreasing in `. Moreover, we assume that leisure 1   ` is a noninferior
good.9 In our model, the type represents the earning ability of agents. That is, if
the labor supply of agent w is `, his gross income is given by y = w`. Temporarily,
let there be no taxes. Then, assuming that the agents cannot save, their budget
constraint in period t is ct = yt since u is strictly increasing in c.
The government would like to maximize social welfare. In this paper, we
consider the following utilitarian social welfare function:
SW =
Z
W0
Z
ZT
U

fct; yt=wtgTt=0

fz(zT)dzT fw(w)dw: (2)
Since the one-period utility function is strictly concave and leisure is a noninferior
good, it follows that redistribution is desirableunder theutilitarianwelfare function
(Seade, 1982). The planner would like to carry out redistribution through income
taxes, but he cannot observe the agents’ types. Thus, the government needs to
design a mechanism that makes the agents reveal their true types.
We consider a direct mechanism in which agents report their types and the
government specifies the pair of consumption c and gross income y for each report
in each period. Specifically, we call xt(  )  (ct(  ); yt(  )) an allocation rule. In general,
the rule could be nonstationary and depend on histories of reports as in Battaglini
and Coate (2008). However, because our planner is sluggish, he cannot enforce
complex rules that vary over time. Moreover, as a consequence, he looks at only
current reports.10 Therefore, we restrict our attention to the allocation rule that
is time-invariant (i.e., xt(  ) = x(  ) for all t) and does not depend on history (or it
9Hellwig (2007) presents another assumption that is a cardinal property of u instead of the
assumption that leisure is a noninferior good, which is an ordinal property.
10Suppose that allocations depend on history. Then, because histories up to period t are vectors
of length t, the domain of the allocation rule must be time-dependent. Therefore, a sluggish
government necessarily can look at only current reports.
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depends on only the current report).11 For example, if agent reports wt in period t,
his allocation in that period is x(wt) = (c(wt); y(wt)).
It might be more straightforward to consider an indirect mechanism in which
the agents report their incomes and the government specifies income taxes for each
report. However, it readily follows that the taxation principle (Hammond, 1979)
applies to our problem because, as we will see, our problem reduces to a static one.
Therefore, characterizing the directmechanism is equivalent to designing a tax rule
(  ) and letting each agent choose his income yt and consumption ct = yt   (yt).
Since the planner cannot observe the agents’ types, he faces incentive compat-
ibility (IC) constraints that require that the agents do not misreport their types.
Recall that our allocation rule is independent of time (i.e., xt(  ) = x(  ) for all t).
Thus, we omit the time subscripts andwrite our allocation rule as x(  ) = (c(  ); y(  )).
Let u(x(w0);w) = u(c(w0); y(w0)=w). This is the one-period utility that agent w ob-
tains when he reports w0. Since the agents report their types in each period, the IC
constraints are imposed in each period. Let Wt be the range of t(  ;  ) for t  1.
Then, the IC constraint in the last period is given by
8w 2 WT; u (x(w);w)  u (x(w0);w) for all w0 2 WT: (ICT)
On the other hand, assuming that the agents cannot save, the IC constraint in
period t 2 f0; 1; 2; :::;T   1g is given by
8w 2 Wt; u(x(w);w) +
X
st+1
s
Z
ZT
max
w˜2Ws
u(x(w˜);ws) fz(zT)dzT
 u(x(w0);w) +
X
st+1
s
Z
ZT
max
w˜2Ws
u(x(w˜);ws) fz(zT)dzT for all w0 2 Wt (ICt)
where ws = s(w; zT). Since our mechanism does not depend on history, the re-
port in the current period does not aect the expected continuation payo (i.e.,P
st+1 s
R
ZT
maxw˜2Ws u(x(w˜);ws) fz(zT)dzT does not depend on the report in period t).
As a result, the IC constraint in period t reduces to
8w 2 Wt; u(x(w);w)  u(x(w0);w) for all w0 2 Wt:
11We note that the government is aware that it is sluggish, so once it chooses its allocation rule, it
knows the rule cannot be changed, and accounts for this when choosing the rule.
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In addition to the IC constraints, the government faces a resource constraint: it
needs to finance G in units of consumption good through the tax. It could be for
a public good that is fixed in quantity (and thus in cost) or the public good could
enter utility as an additively separable term. We assume that the government
can borrow or save at rate . Then, the government has the following resource
constraint (RC):
G 
Z
W0
(w) fw(w)dw +
TX
t=1
t
Z
W0
Z
ZT
(wt) fz(zT)dzT fw(w)dw: (RC)
Suppose that an agent is endowed with type w in the initial period. Let
V(x(  );w) =
Z
ZT
U

fc(wt); y(wt)=wtgTt=0

fz(zT)dzT: (3)
where wt = t(w; zT). This is the expected lifetime utility that the agent obtains by
reporting truthfully in each period. Then, the planner’s problem is given by
max
x(  )
Z
W0
V(x(  );w) fw(w)dw
s.t. (RC) and (ICt) for all t:
(4)
For reference, the first-best allocation rule x(  ) maximizes the utilitarian welfare
function subject to the resource constraint only.
Let W =
ST
t=0Wt. In what follows, we make the following assumption on the
one-period utility function u, in addition to the regularity conditions stated before:
Assumption 1 (Spence-Mirrlees single crossing property: SCP). 8(c; y;w) 2 R2+W,
 wuc(c; y=w)=u`(c; y=w) is increasing in w.12
Here is the key idea of our work. When we solve the problem (4), we exploit
the fact that our mechanism is time-invariant and does not depend on history, and
we consider the utilitarian social welfare function. Therefore, the problem can be
reduced to a static problem inwhich the total mass of agents is expanded to
PT
t=0 
t.
Then, we take the standard approach for static optimal income taxation problems
to solve the resulting problem. That is, we consider a relaxed problem in which
12This assumption is equivalent to assuming that the consumption good is a normal good. See
p. 182 of Mirrlees (1971).
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the IC constraints are replaced with weaker conditions and invoke the fact that a
solution to the relaxed problem is also a solution to the original problem under
Assumption 1.13
Let w = minW and w = maxW (thus, W = [w;w]). Moreover, recall that
x(  ) is the first-best allocation rule that maximizes social welfare subject to the
resource constraint. Then, the main properties of the planner’s allocation rule are
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. (i) x(w)  x(w) for all w 2 W with equality at w = w. If y(w) is strictly
increasing at w = w, x(w) = x(w). Moreover, if y(w) > 0, then x(w)  x(w) for all
w 2 (w;w); (ii) 0(y(w)) = 0 and if y(w) is strictly increasing at w = w, 0(y(w)) = 0.
Moreover, if y(w) > 0, then 0(y(w)) 2 (0; 1) for all w 2 [w;w).
Proof. See Appendix. 
Property (i) states that the allocation is ecient at the top ofW and if the income
is strictly increasing at the bottom of W, the allocation is also ecient there. In
addition, no allocation can be distorted upward from eciency and in particular,
if income is positive, the allocation is distorted downward from eciency in the
interior of W. Property (ii) states that the marginal tax rate is zero at the top of W
and if income is strictly increasing at the bottom ofW, the marginal tax rate is also
zero there. On the other hand, if income is positive, the marginal tax rate is more
than 0 but less then 1 in the interior ofW.
By Proposition 1, as long as everyone works so that y(w) > 0 for all w 2 W, the
allocation is generally first-best and the marginal tax rate is zero only at the top of
the expanded type space W. For illustration, suppose t(w; zT) = w +
Pt
s=0 zs. Then,
if maxZ > 0, no one’s allocation is generally first-best and no one’s marginal tax rate is
zero in the first T periods nor the last period except when the type of the top earner in the
initial period reaches w = maxW. In practice, it is unlikely that the planner sets the
marginal tax rate at the ex post top to zero because he does so only when the shock
of the top earner in the initial period takes the largest value in every period.
The results above are in sharp contrast with those of Battaglini and Coate (2008)
in which the shock follows a Markov chain over two states (high and low). In their
13This argument crucially depends on the fact that mechanism is static. Otherwise, general
assumptions like the single crossing property that connect the relaxed problem to the original one
are not known (Farhi and Werning, forthcoming).
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ecient tax rule, the allocation is distorted only when people’s type is currently
and has always been low. That is, the allocations of agents who are currently, or
have at some point been high types are first-best. Therefore, the fraction of people
whose allocations are distorted is decreasing over time. However, their positive
results crucially depend on the following facts: the support of types is fixed over
time, and the tax rule can depend on history. In our model, the support of types
moves over time, and the tax rule can depend on only the current income. As a
result, all people’s allocations are almost surely distorted in any period.
2.1 Saving
In the analysis above, we assumed that people cannot save nor borrow because
the government confiscates all incomes that are not consumed as in Battaglini and
Coate (2008). In this section, we show that the government actually cannot allow
saving or borrowing under stationary tax rules that depend on only the current
income. To this end, suppose that there is a risk-free bond market and let b(w) be
the endogenous bond holding of agentw. We claim that if b(w) , 0, the government
cannot satisfy the IC constraints under the class of tax ruleswe consider.14 Suppose,
contrary to the claim, that the government can satisfy the IC constraints. Letw be an
interior point of W0 and take zT 2 ZT such that wt = t(w; zT)  maxW0. Consider
agent endowedwith typewt in the initial period. If he reports truthfully in the initial
period, (wt) = y(wt)   c(wt)   b(wt). On the other hand, consider agent endowed
with w in the initial period and suppose that his shock is zT. Then, if he reports
truthfully in period t, (wt) = y(wt)   c(wt) + (1 + R)b(wt 1) where wt 1 = t 1(w; zT)
and R > 0 is the interest rate on bonds. Hence, (1 + R)b(wt 1) =  b(wt). Then,
because t(w; 0) = w and we can make zT arbitrary close to zero, it follows that
b(w) = 0. Therefore, as long as the sluggish government would like to satisfy the
IC constraints, it cannot allow saving or borrowing.
2.2 Aggregate shocks
Weassumed that agents receive idiosyncratic shocks, but our argument remains
intact even if we consider a private or public aggregate shock instead of or in
14Albanesi and Sleet (2006) study time-dependent tax rules that depend on only the current income
and wealth in a dynamic, stochastic model with capital.
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addition to private idiosyncratic shocks. To see this, suppose that draws from
fz(zT) are aggregate shocks, so all agents face the same shock. The social welfare
function does not change because we assumed that the idiosyncratic shocks are
i.i.d. across agents. Moreover, if the aggregate shock is private, the IC constraints
are identical to those in the idiosyncratic case, as long as the idiosyncratic shocks
are i.i.d. across people. Thus, our argument is unchanged. However, if the
aggregate shock is public and the government can also observe the shock, we need
some modifications because the IC constraints are imposed for each realization
of the shock, as opposed to the idiosyncratic case. Suppose that the aggregate
shock is public and let Wt;zT be the range of t(  ; zT). Because of the government’s
sluggishness, the IC constraint in period twhen the shock is zT reduces to
8w 2 Wt;zT ; u(x(w);w)  u(x(w0);w) for all w0 2 Wt;zT :
Then, lettingW =
ST
t=0
S
zT2ZT Wt;zT , the same argument as used for the idiosyncratic
case would follow.15 Moreover, we can readily see that having both aggregate and
idiosyncratic shocks makes it necessary to expand the type space, but does not
change the main result.
3 Conclusion
We considered the optimal dynamic income taxation problem faced by a slug-
gish government that cannot change its tax rule over time. Because of the govern-
ment’s sluggishness, we could reduce our problem to a static one and analytically
characterize the second-best tax rule. We argued that the zero top marginal tax
result is of little importance in practice because it would apply only when the top
earner in the initial period receives the largest value of shock in every period. This
is a probability zero event, so ex post we ensure a positive tax rate for the top type.
Regarding the sluggishness of the government, we have made an extreme as-
sumption: the government cannot make its tax rule time-dependent and thus its
tax rates cannot be history-dependent at all. It might be more realistic to consider
the situation in which the government can make its tax rule time-dependent or
15Note that if the government could look at history, it would suce to let agents report only in
the initial period. Indeed, as long as they report truthfully in the initial period, the government can
see through their misreports in the subsequent periods because it can observe the shock.
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look at past histories at some cost. This should be a subject of future research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We show that due to the sluggishness of the government, our
problem can be reduced to a static problem and then invoke the results of Hellwig
(2007) who analyzes a static optimal taxation problem under the utilitarian welfare
function. As in Hellwig (2007), we consider a relaxed problem by replacing the IC
constraint with a weaker condition that is called the downward IC constraint:
8w 2 Wt; u (x(w);w)  u (x(w0);w) for all w0 2 fw˜ 2 Wt : w˜  wg : (IC0t)
for each t. Thus, the downward IC constraint takes care of only downward devia-
tions. By Lemma 6.2 of Hellwig (2007), x(  ) with nondecreasing c(  ) satisfies (IC0t) if
and only if du(x(w);w)dw  uw(x(w);w) for all w 2 Wt. Thus, when we solve the problem,
we impose the constraints that c(w) is nondecreasing and du(x(w);w)dw  uw(x(w);w) on
W =
ST
t=0Wt instead of the downward IC constraints.
Next, we rewrite the welfare function asZ
W0
V(x(  );w) fw(w)dw
=
Z
W0
2666664u(x(w);w) + TX
t=1
t
Z
ZT
u(x(wt);wt) fz(zT)dzT
3777775 fw(w)dw
=
Z
W0
u(x(w);w) fw(w)dw +
TX
t=1
t
Z
Wt
u(x(wt);wt) ft(wt)dwt
where ft(w) =
R
ZT
fz(zT) fw( 1t (w; z
T))d
 1
t (w;z
T)
dw dz
T. Let fw be an extension of fw to W
(i.e., fw(w) = fw(w) onW0 and fw(w) = 0 onW nW0). Similarly, let ft be an extension
of ft toW. Then, the above expression reduces toZ
W
u(x(w);w)g(w)dw (5)
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where g(w)  fw(w) +PTt=1 t ft(w). Likewise, the resource constraint is reduced to
G 
Z
W
(w)g(w)dw: (6)
Therefore, our relaxed problem is given by
max
x(  )
Z
W
u(x(w);w)g(w)dw
s.t. G 
Z
W
(w)g(w)dw;
c(w) is nondecreasing and du(x(w);w)dw  uw(x(w);w) on W:
(7)
On the other hand, Hellwig (2007) considers a standard static optimal taxation
problem. Specifically, under our notations, his problem is written as
max
x(  )
Z
W0
u(x(w);w) fw(w)dw
s.t. G 
Z
W0
(w) fw(w)dw;
c(w) is nondecreasing and du(x(w);w)dw  uw(x(w);w) on W0:
(8)
Hence, we can see that our problem can be viewed as a static problem in which the
total mass of agents is
PT
t=0 
t, the support of type distribution isW, and the welfare
weight for type w is g(w), and therefore, the arguments of Hellwig (2007) directly
apply. In particular, the property (i) follows from Theorem 6.1 and the property (ii)
from Theorems 4.1 and 6.1 of Hellwig (2007). 
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